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The Failures of the Organic Law On the Integrity of the Political Parties 
and Candidates 
 
 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) had its democratic institutions and processes established 
during the 1960’s. This process began with the establishment of the Legislative Council 
in 1959 and later the House of Assembly in 1964. The discussion of the Organic Law on 
the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) relates to political parties 
and candidates, therefore a brief mention will be made on the historical evolution of 
political parties in Papua New Guinea. 
 
Political parties first emerged in Papua New Guinea in 1967. Two of the earliest parties 
were the Pangu Party and the United Party. Political parties in the history of PNG first 
contested the 1968 national election (Moore and Kooyman, 1998). The emergence of the 
different groups that later became political parties became sporadic which brought about 
the multiparty nature of the party system in the country. During the 1972 election, new 
political groups such as the People’s Progress Party, National Party, Melanesian Alliance 
and other smaller groups emerged and contested the election. Other groups based on 
nationalistic sentiments also contested but most of them did not last after the 1982 
national election (May, 1982). 
 
This paper will look at the failures of the OLIPPAC. The first part will be a general 
discussion of the OLIPPAC. The second part will look at the events after the 2002 
elections, which have affected the effectiveness of the OLIPPAC. The third part will 
discuss how and why the OLIPPAC has failed to provide the much-needed political 
stability. And finally the paper will look at some remedies to the failures. 
 
Background 
 
The first election using the Optional Preferential Voting was conducted in 1964. Political 
parties first emerged in 1967 and contested the second election in 1968. The scenario 
after the 1968 election saw the emergence of divisions based on the political platforms of 
the political parties.  
 
From 1968 to 1972 the division was a result of the disagreements on the issue of 
independence. The division after 1972 to 1977 however was intensified. This was mostly 
due to an obsession by certain politicians such as the late Sir Iambakey Okuk and others 
to satisfy their own interests. Most of the intending votes of no confidence did not 
warrant a change in government with the exception of the changes in government in 1988 
(Namaliu against Wingti), 1994 (Chan against Wingti) and 1999 (Morauta against Skate). 
These votes of no confidence against the governments were justified because of abuses of 
power as well as a growing culture of the governments becoming unresponsive, corrupt 
and most importantly undermining the rule of law. 
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Almost in every parliamentary sitting since the 1977 election, a motion of no confidence 
in the government was either mooted or actually moved. This practice resulted in the 
emergence of a new parliamentary culture such as the Prime Minister being forced to 
make cabinet reshuffles, paying Members of Parliament (MPs) to join either the 
Government or the Opposition, MPs leaving their parties anytime they wish usually by 
saying that their electorates want them to be either in the government or in the opposition 
that is pushing for a vote of no confidence. A party can be left without any members 
through desertion of its members. By having a good chance to be in government, many 
candidates prefer being independents and later join parties that form the government. 
 
Section 145 of the Constitution and the fragmented coalition between the different 
political parties has been responsible for creating and sustaining political instability in the 
country. Section 145 allows MPs especially the opposition to move a motion of no 
confidence against the government at anytime. Governments in Papua New Guinea have 
never served their full term in office as a result of the vote of no confidence. There have 
also been more changes of the government through votes of no confidence rather than 
through the elections. This has greatly affected the ability of the governments to 
implementing their policies. This has also affected the effective delivery of goods and 
services to the people. 
 
Coalition governments in Papua New Guinea can crumble at anytime. There is usually 
nothing in place to maintain an alliance between the political parties in government. The 
collapse of a coalition is usually a result of parties and MPs deserting the other coalition 
partners because they have been promised a better deal with other groups in terms of 
ministerial portfolios, Chairman of Committees and so forth. The 1997 national election 
would provide a good illustration of this. Bill Skate’s party, the People’s National 
Congress (PNC) won only 6 seats. After the election of Skate as the Prime Minister, the 
party membership jumped as high as 44 members. Just before the vote of no confidence 
against his government in July 14th 1999, the PNC was left with only 2 members, 4 less 
than the original members of the party. This is an indication of the fluidity of party 
politics in the country. 
 
Okole (2004) identified four key and mutually interacting factors: (1) a firm voter-
member reciprocal relationship; (2) fluid party system; (3) opportunism; and (4) the 
inherent design of the unicameral legislature. Okole’s factors of political instability are 
lump together in the discussion of instability relating to the OLIPPAC in the paper. 
 
 Sir Michael Somare once said that heading a coalition is like paddling two canoes. There 
is great difficulty in making sure that the two canoes would go in the same direction. 
Coalition governments in Papua New Guinea are like the canoes. 
 
 After Rabbie Namaliu became the Prime Minister in 1988 (defeating Pais Wingti in a 
vote of no confidence), he made and passed an amendment to Section 145, giving an 18 
months grace period to a government before a motion of no confidence can be moved 
(previously it was six months1). The rational behind the 18 months grace period was to 
                                                 
1 MOTIONS OF NO CONFIDENCE (AMMENDMENT OF SECTION 145)  
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allow the government enough time to get some of its policies implemented. The 
amendment however did not deter the Opposition or MPs in general, from moving a vote 
against the Prime Minister. 
 
In an attempt to avoid votes of no confidence, the following practices have become 
predominant resulting in a new style of parliamentary democracy in the country: 
• Great need for the “Number Game”. This is the situation to describe the 
frantic movement of MPs in order to gain control of the government. 
• Numerous Cabinet reshuffles. 
 
• Continued sacking of political parties and MPs by the Prime Minister and 
taking on board new parties and MPs or re-calling the previously sacked party 
and MPs. As reported in the Post Courier (January 26th 2005), Somare is 
thinking of recalling PNC into the government and sacking the PNG Party 
which has three of its MPs as Ministers. Since the 2002 election, the country 
has had three (3) Deputy Prime Ministers. Since mid 2004, the office has been 
vacant. The Prime Minister has announced recently that an appointment will 
be made soon (Post Courier January 10th 2005). 
 
• Long adjournment of Parliament in order to avoid the vote of no confidence. 
Bill Skate started this practice followed by Sir Mekere Morauta and now Sir 
Michael Somare. 
 
• Splits in political parties. This is usually initiated and sustained by the Prime 
Minister to maintain control over the opposition. 
 
To address the problem of instability, the Morauta Government passed a major reform in 
2001. This resulted in the passing of the Organic Law On The Integrity Of Political 
Parties And Candidates (OLIPPAC) by the Parliament.  
 
1. The OLIPPAC - General Discussion 
 
The OLIPPAC is the enabling legislation of the Constitution’s Section 129 – The 
Integrity of Political Parties and Section 130 – Integrity of Candidates. The OLIPPAC 
has eight parts: Preliminary (definitions), Political Parties Generally, Registration Of 
Political Parties, Central Fund Board Of Management, Funding Political Parties, 
Financial Returns, Strengthening Of Political Parties, and Miscellaneous. 
 
As the OLIPPAC promised a new beginning in the politics of PNG, its task was to 
address the problem of instability and to strengthen the party system. Sir Michael 
Somare, the first Prime Minister of PNG and the current one, remarked then that it was 
time to introduce such a law to bring about political stability. Sir Mekere Morauta, the 
Prime Minister who instituted the reform, said that it would instill discipline in the MPs 
                                                                                                                                                 
Section 145 (4) of the constitution is amended by repealing the words “six months” and replacing them 
with the words “eighteen months”.  
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and the political parties. Professor John Nonggorr, the architect of the law argued in his 
numerous newspaper commentaries that political stability would replace instability and 
this would bring about other positive political developments in the country. 
 
Nonggorr in the focus in the Post Courier (November 9th 2004) summarized four main 
objectives of the OLIPPAC: 
 
a) To ensure that political parties were properly registered with 
appropriate structures such as membership base, officers of a party 
outside and inside Parliament with a constitution clearly setting out 
the rules of a political party.  
 
b) To require candidates who win elections and political parties 
that contest elections to disclose their financial affairs in relation to 
contesting such elections. 
 
c) To set up an office to be in charge of registration of political 
parties and to administer its financial disclosure provision. A 
Central Fund Board was established for this purpose with the 
Registrar of Political Parties providing secretarial support.  
 
d) To provide some sense of order in the running of the 
parliamentary wings of political parties. This would be achieved by 
setting specific rules for MPs belonging to political parties to abide 
by.   
 
According to Nonggorr, much of the first three objectives have been very well achieved.  
However he said that the fourth objective was controversial because, by law, political 
parties were to be forced to do things that in older democracies had developed gradually 
and naturally. Indeed the fourth objective is the most controversial part of the OLIPPAC 
and the one in which the paper will thoroughly analyse because of its contribution to the 
failure of the OLIPPAC. 
 
There are three specific measures set by the OLIPPAC to achieve the fourth objective: 
a) To ensure a Prime Minister is appointed after a general election in an 
orderly way with direct relationship to the way voters expressed their wishes;2 
 
b) To prohibit MPs wishing to leave a political party to give substantive 
reasons for doing so. The Ombudsman Commission must investigate these 
reasons. This measure was to stop Members of Parliament from resigning and 
joining other political parties; and 
 
                                                 
2 The view by Nonggorr can be challenged because in PNG the total votes a political party gets is ignored 
to determine the popularity of a party. It is the total number of seats a party wins that is considered to 
determine the popularity of political parties. 
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c) To force each registered political party to remain as a single cohesive body 
in making decisions on the most critical areas impairing on political stability: 
in the election of a Prime Minister during a no confidence vote; in voting on 
constitutional amendments; and in voting on a budget. The OLIPPAC does 
this by requiring the parliamentary wing of each political party to decide how 
their MPs would vote in these areas and by requiring further that MPs of a 
party must vote in accordance with the party resolution or may abstain but not 
vote against it. 
 
Has the OLIPPAC been able to ensure that political stability and strengthening of 
political parties are guaranteed especially after the 2002 national election? The answers to 
this question would enable us to identify the failures of the OLIPPAC, which is the main 
focus of the paper. 
 
2. Events After the 2002 National Election 
 
The period after the 2002 national election was supposedly going to see a new beginning 
for PNG because of the OLIPPAC.  
 
According to the OLIPPAC Section 71, the party that won the majority of the seats in 
Parliament would be called upon to form the Government. The National Alliance Party 
(NA), which won 19 seats, was called to form the government. Requiring the numbers, 
the NA formed a coalition with the smaller parties to give it the required majority. 
 
However there were certain activities that occurred during this time (formation of the 
government) that posed a danger to the legitimacy of the OLIPPAC. The first was the 
attempt by some smaller parties and a group of independent MPs to form a coalition and 
challenge the National Alliance in the build up to the formation of the government. This 
is contrary to Section 71.  
 
The second was the formation of a new political party by the man who strongly pushed 
the OLIPPAC through, Sir Mekere Morauta. He also brought into question the 
effectiveness of the OLIPPAC because political parties are supposed to be form outside 
of Parliament and register itself and compete with others in an election.  
 
The third was the increase in the numbers of political parties. Almost 43 political parties 
were registered and contested the election. The large number of political parties brought 
back bad memories of the one-man party; parties that contested and disappeared after the 
election; parties winning only one or two seats and then disbanding and joining other 
parties.  
 
And the fourth was the large number of independent candidates that contested and won 
17 seats in the election. This group has been the major source of instability in the past 
because of their ability to move from one group to another at anytime. The OLIPPAC did 
not provide an effective way to regulate this group with the exception of Section 76. The 
Section allows independent candidates to join political parties at any time. 
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 Section 76 failed to recognize the fact that this group campaigned on an independent or 
personal platform therefore their platforms are not compatible to any of the existing 
political parties. The ineffectiveness of Section 76 could and would result in independent 
candidates joining political parties and leaving at their own prerogative. Thus, the 
experience of the past persists in this case. Even some independent MPs have become 
leaders of political parties3. 
 
3. Failures of the OLIPPAC 
 
How has the OLIPPAC failed and what are the reasons for the failure? 
The first area is on the vote of no confidence stated in Section 145 of the Constitution. Sir 
Michael Somare, despite the guarantees in the OLIPPAC Sections 77(1), realized that the 
use of Section 145 would persist and would affect his chances in staying in office. This is 
despite the fact that he was voted in as the Prime Minister by an overwhelming majority 
of 89 votes and that those 89 cannot vote against him unless a party resolution says so or 
they can abstain from voting.  
 
As a result of the failure of the OLIPPAC to protect the government against Section 145, 
Somare in 2003 introduced an amendment to Section 145 to extend the grace period from 
18 months to 36 months. Much of 2004 was dominated by disagreements on this issue as 
well as the move to remove the government from office through the vote of no 
confidence. For the first time in the history of PNG politics the Opposition members 
stayed away from the entire July/August 2004 parliamentary sitting (Post Courier August 
4th 2004).  
 
As a result of this the government called on all Papua New Guineans to seriously look at 
the performance and conduct of their elected representatives. The call was aimed at 
scaring renegade government MPs aligned with the Opposition camping in Alotau (Post 
Courier July 7th 2004). 
 
The government in August 2004 adjourned Parliament to November to avoid a vote of no 
confidence. This was nothing new as it was the norm in the past. The OLIPPAC has not 
been able to deter this practise. 
 
Because of Sections 77(1) and 80, those who voted for the Prime Minister in the first 
sitting of Parliament, could not vote against the Prime Minister in a vote of no confidence 
and must vote for any constitutional amendment that is proposed by the Prime Minister. 
 
To the layman’s point of view the Prime Minister and his government are protected by 
the OLIPPAC. However the maneuvering by the same MPs who voted for the Prime 
Minister behind the scenes not to support the Prime Minister’s constitutional amendment 
indicates that the OLIPPAC is defective. It is defective in the sense that it left it wide 
                                                 
3 Peter O’Neil became the leader of the Peoples National Congress and currently the Opposition Leader. 
Moses Maladina was appointed the leader of the Peoples Action Party and was once the Deputy Prime 
Minister. Tim Neville, an independent is claiming that he is the leader of the United Resources Party.  
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open for the MPs to decide, as usual, on their own whether to support any amendment or 
not. Somare reacted by sacking those Ministers who publicly made their intentions not to 
support the amendment. The casualty of this was the Peoples Progress Party (PPP) when 
its leader and Deputy Prime Minister Andrew Baing refused to support the amendment 
and was sacked by the Prime Minister. He moved over to the Opposition despite the fact 
that some of his members remained with the government.  
 
Nonggorr in his explanation of the OLIPPAC stated that MPs must vote according to the 
party resolution or may abstain but not vote against this as shown in the behaviour of the 
MPs. That is inadequate in instilling a sense of discipline and loyalty. There was much 
confusion when MPs were coming out in public and stating their opposition to the 
amendment despite the fact that Section 77(1) and 80 does not allow them to do so. 
 
The second area that saw the failure of the OLIPPAC in maintaining political stability is 
when political parties were divided in Parliament and the confusion surrounding the 
rightful leaders of the political parties. The following political parties had two leaders 
each, one leading a group in the Opposition while the other leading a group in the 
Government: the PPP; United Resources Party (URP); Peoples Action Party (PAP); and 
Pangu Party. 
 
While there were tussles going on about who is the legitimate leader of the parties 
mentioned above, the OLIPPAC did not provide any explanation or remedy for this 
confusion. The Prime Minister also manipulated this confusion by splitting the parties for 
his own political convenience. This brought about the memories of the Skate’s regime 
when he masterfully divided the political parties to maintain him in office from 1997 to 
1999. Again the OLIPPAC failed to offer any explanation whether the action of the 
Prime Minister was justified. Even the promise made by Bill Skate’s wife that she would 
divorce Skate if his party PNC leave the Somare led coalition. 
 
The Prime Minister in his decision to sack Moses Maladina did not sack the PAP but only 
Maladina. As a result the PAP members who were Ministers in the government sacked 
Maladina as the leader and elected Brian Pulayasi as the new leader in order to remain 
with the government (Post Courier August 4 2004). The case of those who were sacked 
by the Prime Minister is not always clear. Andrew Baing’s case is a good example. When 
the Prime Minister sacked him as the Deputy Prime Minister, he moved to join the 
Opposition while the other members of PPP stayed with the government. As a result, the 
group with the government elected a new leader, Paul Tienstein. It was only Alan Marat 
who made the correct decision by complying with Section 77 (1) when he was sacked as 
the Deputy Prime Minister and leader of PPP but moved to the back benches of the 
government. 
 
This confusion created by the MPs has angered the general public. As reported in the 
Post Courier (July 9th 2004) the General Assembly of the Catholic Church of Papua New 
Guinea has had enough and is thoroughly disgusted at the confusion arising from the 
current political games in Waigani. The Post Courier (January 7 2005) reported another 
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major split in PAP and Peoples National Congress (PNC), where factions of both parties 
have moved over to the government. 
 
The promise by the OLIPPAC to strengthen the party system has not materialised. The 
opposite of that has emerged making the parties to be worse off in terms of its leadership 
and membership in Parliament. 
 
The third area is the continued recognition of Independent MPs beside MPs who belong 
to political parties.  The Independent MPs have been the major source of instability 
because of their ability to join any group for their own convenience. This practice 
continued after the 2002 national election. The OLIPPAC allowed them to join political 
parties in Section 76.  
 
Leading to the formation of the government after the 2002 national election, a group of 
Independent MPs formed a group called the Independent bloc or the Kimbe Group. They 
then held discussions with the groups intending to form the government and decided to 
join the URP. The URP had only one MP elected, Sam Akoitai, and supported Somare. 
Upon joining the URP a faction of the URP led by Tim Neville moved to join the 
Opposition and since then he has been a major player in attempting to move a vote of no 
confidence against the government. Tim Neville has even been arrested for alleged 
bribery of MPs in order for them to support the vote of no confidence. 
Despite regulating how the independent MPs could vote or not for the Prime Minister and 
to join political parties at any time, the OLIPPAC has not been able to maintain control 
over the independent candidates. The action of Tim Neville and his group is a clear 
indication of this. He is also claiming that he is the rightful leader of URP. 
 
The other area that has contributed to the failure of the OLIPPAC is the lack of strict 
enforcement of the provisions of the OLIPPAC. The enforcement of the OLIPPAC is the 
responsibility of the Registrar of Political Parties. The OLIPPAC does provide the 
creation of the Office of the Registrar in Section 8. The main responsibility of the 
Registrar of Political Parties is to ensure that political parties and MPs comply with the 
various provisions of the OLIPPAC. The functions and duties of the Registrar are 
outlined in Section 10 of the OLIPPAC. 
 
Since the confusion relating to the splits in parties and other matters relating to the 
resolution of political parties, the Registrar of Political Parties maintained silence over 
these issues. This gave an impression to the MPs and the Speaker that what they were 
doing complied with the OLIPPAC. The lack of response by the Registrar has led to a 
number of MPs calling for the resignation of the Registrar. 
 
With the lack of response from the Registrar, the Speaker had had a field day issuing and 
giving his own interpretations of the OLIPPAC on who was the legal party leader and 
how MPs should sit in Parliament. He continuously used the Standing Orders of 
Parliament to suppress the political parties and factions in the Opposition. The Speaker’s 
action led to Opposition attempting to remove both the Prime Minister and the Speaker in 
a vote of no confidence (Post Courier November 4th 2004). 
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It was not until November 2004 that the Registrar made some rulings, mostly against the 
decisions of the Speaker. The Registrar overturned most of the rulings recognizing those 
MPs whom the Speaker had refused to recognize as the rightful leaders of their respective 
parties. The testing case for this was the PPP’s leadership tussle between Andrew Baing 
and Paul Tsientsien as the leader but the Registrar affirmed that Tienstein was expelled 
from the party and never appealed against the decision. 
 
The decision by the Registrar now requires that the Speaker should enforce the law by 
allowing MPs who have been wrongly placed in the government benches to move to the 
Opposition benches (Post Courier November 9th 2004). 
 
The ruling by the Registrar never resolved the splits that were faced by the political 
parties. As reported in the Post Courier January 7th 2005, the Opposition has fallen apart 
with the PAP now back with the government and a faction of PNC also moving to the 
government. The Registrar since then has not made any ruling on these moves by the two 
parties, especially when the resolution of the PNC was to move to the Opposition when 
they were sacked by the Prime Minister in early 2004. 
 
The Registrar has also not provided any advice on the moves towards the formation of a 
grand coalition – comprising of parties in government and those in the opposition. The 
OLIPPAC is quiet on this issue and advice must be forthcoming to clarify this move (The 
National January 7th 2005). 
 
The final area to show how the OLIPPAC has failed originates from the culture of leaders 
breaching the law that they themselves have passed to satisfy their own interests. It is not 
unusual in PNG for this to occur. Laws passed by Parliament to address certain issues are 
either deliberately abused or the leaders finding ways to overrule the legitimacy of the 
law. One such law is the Leadership Code and now the OLIPPAC is facing the problem. 
 
All the leaders know the rational behind the law but they deliberately ignore the need to 
abide by the various provisions of the law. Leadership tussles, ignoring the resolution of 
the party and splits in the parties are indicative of the Members of Parliament deliberately 
ignoring the OLIPPAC. 
 
4. Remedies 
 
What would be some remedies to address the functions of the OLIPPAC outlined under 
Part 3 of the paper? 
 
Firstly, there is no real need to amend Section 145 of the Constitution to extend the grace 
period. The intention of Section 145 is highly democratic because it safeguards the 
country from an irresponsible and autocratic government. It is the OLIPPAC especially 
Sections 71, 77, 78, 79, and 80 that must be tightened. MPs who vote for a Prime 
Minister cannot vote against the Prime Minister in a vote of no confidence (Section 77), 
voting on the national budget (Section 79), and voting on a Constitutional Law (Section 
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80). These respective provisions of the OLIPPAC have to be strictly enforced in order to 
avoid the current situation, in which those who voted for the Prime Minister openly 
opposed the constitutional amendment and went further by allying with groups to topple 
the government from office. 
 
It is therefore important to educate the MPs on these provisions of the OLIPPAC soon 
after they are elected into office. Most of the confusions arose because many of the MPs 
had very little knowledge of what is required of them by the OLIPPAC. 
 
As part of this remedy, Okole (2004) also argued that the OLIPPAC should be reviewed. 
According to Okole, 
 
There is a need to identify the weak areas and make sure that this law stays ahead 
of the types of insidious practices that we have just witnessed in recent months 
(referring to 2004). To give one potential problem, there is now ground to fear 
that independent candidacy would be greatly abused in the next election. 
Something needs to be done before 2007 to address this constitutional right with a 
view of protecting it. But at the same time, the integrity of Parliament should not 
be compromised by free floating MPs with devious tactics. Independents can 
unnecessarily sink or change a coalition formation by altering numbers on both 
sides of Parliament (p. 2, 2004). 
 
Secondly, the need to strengthen political parties through party resolution must be strictly 
adhered to. MPs have to be reminded that they could only vote according to the party 
resolution. Failure to abide to this would result in them being expelled from the party 
(Section 72). 
 
The MPs that belong to political parties must sign a declaration of loyalty – something 
that the OLIPPAC is quiet on – stating that they would abide by the party’s resolution at 
all times. Failing to do this would result in them being expelled and investigated by the 
Ombudsman Commission for misconduct. 
The sacking of a party leader or party members by the Prime Minister does not mean that 
that person should immediately join the Opposition. He should either move to the back 
benches or the party as a group through a resolution may declare that they no longer 
support the Prime Minister and would move to the Opposition. Members of Parliament 
who breach this rule should be removed immediately and a by-election conducted. 
 
The third solution, which is related to the first remedy, is that once a vote of no 
confidence is successful against the government, Parliament should be dissolved and a 
fresh election should be conducted. This is not a new idea as it was contained in a report 
on overhauling the electoral system in the 1990s (Dorney, 1990). As stated by Dorney, 
 
Referring to a rampant lack of discipline in the political arena, Dr Walter 
proposed, as a starting point for reform, a constitutional change to give the Prime 
Minister power, to dissolve parliament at any time and call elections. Dr Walter 
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argued that the existing system was like a game in which the rules had become so 
warped that all the players had lost sight of the desired end result (p. 81, 1990). 
 
 There need to be amendments made to Section 145 of the Constitution to allow this 
process. Sir Michael Somare proposed this idea after the 2002 election but it has died out 
because he received very little support from the Opposition and even from within his 
coalition partners. This solution would make the MPs to think twice before attempting to 
move a vote of no confidence. MPs in PNG do not want to stay in office for just 18 
months therefore they would really have to come up with some good justifications to 
remove a government from office. 
 
The fourth solution is to adequately resource the Registrar of Political Parties, in order for 
him to effectively carry out his duties. Nonggorr noted in his focus that the office of the 
Registrar has not been adequately funded and this has affected his ability to swiftly 
respond to problems facing the political parties4. 
 
The Registrar has also failed to provide information to the public regarding the various 
provisions of the OLIPPAC. Many people as indicated in the letters to the editors of the 
two dailies asked the question of why the practices of the past still persist. The Registrar 
needs to respond to such queries in order to educate the people of the OLIPPAC and 
explain whether the action of the MPs and political parties are within the OLIPPAC. 
 
The fifth solution is to ensure that the political parties that contest an election must put 
forward their platforms or manifestoes. This would include the independent candidates 
and if any platform is the same as the other political parties and independent candidates 
then that manifesto would be rejected and a new one submitted. 
 
The final remedy is to do more with maintaining the rule of law and respecting the 
legitimacy of the laws such as the OLIPPAC. The OLIPPAC was passed in Parliament 
with clearly stated objectives. It is therefore the responsibility of the MPs to make sure 
that they must comply with the OLIPPAC. The manner in which the MPs behaved in and 
out of Parliament was as if the OLIPPAC does not exist. The Opposition MPs camping in 
Alotau and missing an entire Parliament sitting in July/August 2003 had never happened 
before. Why has it happened when a law was in existence prohibiting such practices? The 
answer is simply that the culture of breaking the law and later seeking redress in the 
Court still persists. 
 
The actions of the MPs have clearly breached the OLIPPAC and have affected the 
legitimacy of the OLIPPAC. The comments by the Governor of East New Britain, Mr. 
Dion, that the OLIPPAC has created stability (Post Courier January 17th 2005) cannot go 
unchallenged. The paper has shown that the OLIPPAC is in trouble and there is a real 
need to review and strengthen it. However he also said some things that the paper has 
said: MPs should educate themselves of the basic requirements and procedures of the 
OLIPPAC; the OLIPPAC needs to be reviewed and enforced strictly; and the OLIPPAC 
                                                 
4 The National (January 19th 2005), a number of positions within the Registrar’s Office were advertised. 
This would greatly enhance the capacity of the Registrar to deal with problems facing the parties 
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was to bring about positive developments. His comments that “laws are created and 
enacted for good intention, however, people with ulterior motives were the ones using 
them for their personal and self interest” (Post Courier January 17th 2005). 
 
Mr. Dion is referring to the final solution that the rule of law must be maintained at all 
times. It is therefore the responsibility of the leaders to do that. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper has discussed the major parts of the OLIPPAC and the failures of the 
OLIPPAC as currently experienced in the country. Despite the claim that the current 
government of Sir Michael Somare has lasted much longer in office (more than 2 years) 
than the previous governments, this cannot be attributed to the OLIPPAC. The main 
reason is that political instability has taken a new twist through long adjournments of 
Parliament, lack of enforcement of the OLIPPAC by the Registrar and the government 
and the Speaker’s own interpretations of the OLIPPAC. 
 
The year 2004 was filled with chaos in Parliament. This was a result of the MPs and 
political parties trying to find their own ways to go around the OLIPPAC in order to 
topple the government. 
 
The OLIPPAC was passed in Parliament to achieve certain objectives but they have been 
hijacked by the existing culture where the interests of the MPs do come before the 
interests of the people. The result is the lack of prudent leadership being provided and 
simply the continued suffering by the people. 
 
The solutions given would go a long way in achieving the envisaged objectives of the 
OLIPPAC and that is by maintaining political stability and strengthening the party 
system. The responsibility therefore lies with the MPs and the Registrar of Political 
Parties. 
 
The assertion that the OLIPPAC has fostered stability is far from the truth. But the 
intentions of the OLIPPAC are noble and would go a long way in transforming the 
political environment in the country. 
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STATUTES 
 
The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 1975 
 
S129 Allows for the enactment of an Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties.  
S130 Allows for the enactment of an Organic Law on the Integrity of Candidates. 
S145 Motions of No Confidence – procedures. 
 
The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 2001 
S8 Establishment of Registrar of Political Parties 
 
S10 Functions & Duties of the Registrar 
 As laid out in Part III Division 2 – The Registrar Sections 11 to 15. 
 
S41 Vacancy Not Affect The Powers Or Functions 
 The exercise or performance of a power or function of the Board is not invalidated 
by reason only of a vacancy in the membership of the Board.  
 
S71 Invitation to Form Government 
 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), on the date of return of writs in a general election,   
the Electoral Commission (EC) shall advice the Head of State (HoS) of the registered 
political parties which endorsed the greatest number of declared candidates. Upon this 
advice & acting on the advice of the EC, the HoS shall invite that party to form the 
government. 
  
(2) Where 2 or more registered political parties endorsed an equal number of the  
greatest number of declared candidates, upon advice of EC, the HoS shall invite that 
party to form the government. 
 
 (3)(a), (b), & (c) Such invitation shall be conveyed to the public officer of the  
registered political parties or the party; and notified to the Clerk of Parliament; and  
published in the National Gazzette. 
 
 (4)(a) At the first meeting of Parliament being the election of the PM following 
the national elections, the registered political party(ies) may nominate a PM. 
 
 + (5), (6), & (7) 
 
S76 Member Elected Without Endorsement 
 
 (1) Allows a MP elected without endorsement by a registered political party to  
  join a registered political party at any time. 
 (2)(b)Even those resigning from registered political parties whose action does not to 
amount to misconduct in office (investigated by an Ombudsman Commission 
or an Inquiry). 
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S77 Provides for voting in the case of a motion of no confidence or in the election of a 
PM following resignation where the MP resigning is nominated for election. 
   
(1) A MP who is  (a) not a member of a registered party at the time of election of 
a PM; or (b) voted for the member elected PM in the election; or (c) other the 
MP in 2 
shall not vote for a motion of no confidence in (i) the PM; or (ii) the Ministry 
headed by that PM; or (iii) a Minister appointed on the advice of that PM. 
 
(2) A MP who is (1)(a); (1)(b); and (c) subsequently, at least 6 months before, a 
motion of confidence 
 shall vote in a motion of no confidence in (i) the PM; or (ii) the Ministry headed by 
that PM; or (iii) a Minister appointed on the advice of that PM. 
 
(3) A MP who is not (1)(a); (b) did not vote for the member elected PM in the 
election; and (c) has not subsequently joined a registered political party at least 
6 months prior to a motion of no confidence in 
shall not vote against the motion of confidence in (i) the PM; or (ii) the Ministry 
headed by that PM; or (iii) a Minister appointed on the advice of that PM. 
 
S78 Provides for voting in the election of PM where the resigned PM has not been 
nominated for the next PM; or otherwise in a vacancy in the office of the PM 
(S78(a)&(b)). 
 
A MP who is not a member of a registered political party may vote for any nominee 
in the election of the next PM. 
 
 
S79 Provides for voting on the national budget. 
 
 (1)(a) A MP whose registered with a political party shall vote in accordance of 
the resolution of the political parties determined by its MPs. 
 By Section (2) if this member votes against the national budget his/her vote will not 
be counted.   
 
 (1)(b) a MP who (i) who is not a Member of a registered with a political party; 
(ii) who voted the PM whose Govt is proposing t National Budget, shall vote for the 
National Budget.
By Section (2) if this member votes against the national budget his/her vote will not 
be counted. 
 
 (1)(c) a MP who (i) who is not a Member of a registered with a political party; 
(ii) who did not vote the PM whose Govt is proposing the National Budget,  shall 
vote for or against the National Budget. 
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 (3) Where any question arise as to whether or not a vote in the national budget 
constitutes a vote, the Speaker’s decision is final.  
 
S80 Provides for voting on an enactment, amendment or repeal of a constitutional 
law 
 
 (1)(a) A MP whose registered with a political party shall vote in accordance of 
the resolution of the political parties determined by its MPs. 
 By Section (2) if this member votes against the enactment, amendment or repeal of 
a constitutional law his/her vote will not be counted.   
 
 (1)(b) a MP who (i) who is not a Member of a registered with a political party; 
(ii) who voted the PM whose Govt is proposing the National Budget, shall vote for 
the National Budget.
By Section (2) if this member votes against the enactment, amendment or repeal of 
a constitutional law his/her vote will not be counted. 
 
 (1)(c) a MP who (i) who is not a Member of a registered with a political party; 
(ii) who did not vote the PM whose Govt is proposing the National Budget,  shall 
vote for or against the enactment, amendment or repeal of a constitutional law. 
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